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BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL MISREPRESENTATION OF INTENTIONS
by Vincent P. Crawford
*
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"Lord, what fools these mortals be!"—Puck, A Midsummer Night’s Dream,A c t3
"You may fool all the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all
the time; but you can’t fool all of the people all the time."—Abraham Lincoln
"Now give Barnum his due."—John Conlisk (2001)
Abstract
Starting from Hendricks and McAfee's (2000) example of the Allies' decision to
feint at Calais and attack at Normandy on D-Day, this paper models misrepresentation of
intentions to competitors or enemies. Allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic
rationality and rational players' responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via
costless, noiseless messages. In many cases the model has generically unique pure-
strategy sequential equilibria, in which rational players exploit boundedly rational
players, but are not themselves fooled. In others, the model has generically essentially
unique mixed-strategy sequential equilibria, in which rational players' strategies protect
allplayers fromexploitation.
Keywords: lying, misrepresentation of intentions, preplay communication,
noncooperative games, conflict (JEL C72, D72, D80)
*Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, California,
92093-0508. I am grateful to John Conlisk, Miguel Costa-Gomes, Herb Newhouse, Joel Sobel, and Kang-
Oh Yi for helpful advice; and to the National Science Foundation for research support.2
Lying for strategic advantage about planned actions, or intentions,i sac o m m o n
feature of economic and political as well as military life. Such lying frequently takes the
extreme form of active misrepresentation, as opposed to less than full, honest disclosure.
Examples range from the University of California's three (!) consecutive "last chance"
voluntary early retirement incentive programs in the early 1990s; ex-President George
Bush's regrettably memorable 1988 campaign promise, "Read my lips: no new taxes"; the
universal practice of lying about planned currency devaluations; Nathan Rothschild's
pretense of having received early news of a British defeat at Waterloo; and Hitler's 1939
non-aggression pact with Stalin.
1 In other cases, the effects of active misrepresentation
are duplicated by tacitly exploiting widespread misperceptions, as in accelerationist
monetary policy; periodic but unpredictable temporary investment tax credits, or
regularizations of the status of illegal immigrants; the failure to disclose known product
safety hazards; and deceptive accounting practices in the private and the public sector.
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These examples share two common features. All involve misrepresentation via
agreements, statements, or non-statements that in themselves have little or no direct costs.
And all involve situations in which the parties have predominantly conflicting interests,
so that successful deception benefits the deceiver only at the expense of the deceived.
Nonetheless, the misrepresentation often succeeds. In fact, in many of the examples the
public has so completely internalized the logic of misrepresentation that criticism of the
gullibility of those deceived is as common as criticism of the misrepresentation.
3
Theory lags behind the public's intuition. The examples' common features suggest
that, to a first approximation, they can be modeled as communication via costless
messages ("cheap talk") in a zero-sum two-person game. But in such a model costless
messages must be ignored in equilibrium: If a player could benefit by responding to the
1Roland Benabou and Guy Laroque (1992) give several interesting examples concerning lying to
manipulate financial markets, including Rothschild's, which allowed him to make large clandestine
purchases of British government securities at depressed prices. Examples of lying in international politics
are easy to find, and it is probably no accident that there is a board game called Diplomacy in which
success depends on forming unenforceable agreements with other players and being the first to break them.
2Paul Krugman (2001) discusses the current Bush administration's use of "creative" accounting to make the
2001 tax cut appear feasible without dipping into the Social Security surplus, an example that was highly
topical before the question was made moot by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
3Mike Royko's (1988) prescient view of Bush's "Read my lips" promise is an entertaining example. An
official who does not lie about his country's plan to devalue its currency risks being removed from office, if
not institutionalized. Other examples are explicitly covered by proverbs such as "All's fair in love and war."3
other player's message, his response would hurt the other player, who would therefore do
better to make his message uninformative. Thus, in equilibrium no information is
conveyed by the message, but neither is anyone fooled by it.
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This result is appealing in its simplicity, but it leaves us with no systematic way to
think about an important phenomenon. This paper seeks to provide one by proposing a
way to model bounded strategic rationality and rational players' responses to it, and using
it to analyze a simple model of misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies.
My analysis is inspired in part by Kenneth Hendricks and R. Preston McAfee's
(2000; henceforth "HM") analysis of misrepresentation of intentions via what they call
"feints" or "inverted signaling." HM's primary interest, like mine, is in economic and
political applications; but they motivate their analysis by Operation Fortitude, the Allies'
successful attempt to mislead the Germans about their intention to land in Normandy
rather than the Pas de Calais (the obvious choice ex ante) on D-Day, 6 June 1944, and I
will follow them in this.
5 Their model is a zero-sum two-person game. First the attacker
chooses (possibly randomly) between two possible locations and allocates a fixed budget
of force between them. Next, the defender privately observes a binary signal whose
probability distribution depends on the attacker's allocation, and allocates (possibly
randomly) his own budget of force between the two locations. The attack location and
players' force allocations then determine their payoffs. The attacker's allocation is like a
noisy message to the defender, but as in other models of costly signaling, its large direct
payoff implications sometimes allow equilibria in which it is not ignored.
HM assume that the payoff function and the conditional probability distribution of
the signal are both symmetric across locations. They show, under plausible additional
assumptions, that equilibrium in their game must involve some attempt by the attacker to
misrepresent his intentions (allocating force to both locations with positive probability)
4See Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel's (1982) and Joseph Farrell's (1993) analyses of strategic
communication of private information and intentions. Crawford and Sobel's equilibria have no active
misrepresentation, only intentional vagueness, taking the extreme form of no transmission if the Sender's
and Receiver's preferences differ enough to make the game effectively zero-sum; Farrell coined the term
"babbling" for such equilibria. Farrell and Matthew Rabin (1996) and Crawford (1998) survey the theory.
5The deception was so successful that the Germans kept 19 divisions in Calais for several critical days after
D-Day. HM summarize the history; see also Gordon Harrison (1951, especially Appendix A) and Anthony
Kemp (1994). HM also give several examples of economic and political misrepresentation, in which firms4
and that his attempt succeeds (inducing the defender to allocate force to both locations
with positive probability). For, if the defender ignored his observation of the signal, the
attacker would assign all of his force to his intended attack location; but if the defender
anticipated this, the attacker would prefer to allocate some force to the other location.
HM identify equilibria in their model in two cases, distinguished by the signal's
informativeness. When the signal is not very informative, they identify "full-defense"
equilibria, in which the attacker deterministically allocates most of his force to one attack
location but randomizes the location itself, and the defender allocates all of his own force
deterministically, to the location the signal suggests is more likely to be attacked. When
the signal is more informative, they identify "split-defense" equilibria, in which the
attacker randomizes his allocation and attack location in such a way that the defender can
draw no inference from the signal, and the defender also randomizes his allocation. In
these equilibria, with positive probability the attacker allocates more than half his force to
t h el o c a t i o nh ed o e snot attack. HM also obtain intriguing comparative statics results,
showing that when the signal is not very informative a reduction in noise hurts the
attacker; but that when it is more informative, a reduction in noise benefits the attacker.
HM stress that their explanation of misrepresentation depends on the noisiness of
the signal: "With perfect observability, feints differ from the standard analysis in
inconsequential ways. In particular, were the Germans to observe the actual allocation of
allied forces, it would not have been possible for the Allies to fool the Germans. Thus,
imperfect observation is a critical element for modeling feints."
HM's analysis makes significant progress in understanding the phenomenon of
misrepresentation, but it has three troubling aspects. I shall describe them from the point
of view of Operation Fortitude, although they are equally troubling in other applications.
First, the cost to the Allies of faking the preparations for an invasion of Calais was
small compared to that of the preparations for the actual invasion of Normandy, hence
more like cheap talk than HM's identification of feints with sizeable fractions (sometimes
more than half) of the attacker's force would suggest. The Germans knew as well as the
Allies that it was feasible to fake, or conceal, invasion preparations at no great cost. In a
distort their exploration or bidding strategies to mislead competitors, political candidates campaign in areas
they believe are unimportant to divert their opponents' efforts from areas they consider crucial, and so on.5
standard equilibrium analysis, they would then rationally ignore both the faked evidence
that the attack would be at Calais and the lack of evidence that it would be at Normandy.
But they didn't—and Allied planners didn't expect them to, with anything like certainty.
Second, HM's analysis does not reflect the asymmetry between Normandy and
Calais that is arguably the most salient feature of Operation Fortitude.
6 Why not feint at
Normandy and attack at Calais instead, particularly if the deception has a fair chance of
success? Allied planners rejected Calais in favor of Normandy early in their planning,
mainly (but not entirely) because the proximity to England that made it the obvious attack
location was also obvious to the Germans, who were expected to defend it so heavily that
on balance, Normandy would be preferable (Harrison (1951)). Neither Allied planners'
choice of Normandy nor the fact that they did not explicitly randomize it is inconsistent
with HM's equilibria per se, because they assign positive probabilities to both attack
locations and in a mixed-strategy equilibrium in beliefs, a player need not bear any
uncertainty about his own decision (Robert Aumann and Adam Brandenburger (1995)).
But Allied planners were not indifferent between the locations, and an explanation that
treats their choice as an accidental feature of the history may miss something important.
Finally, an analysis of equilibrium in a game without precedent—of which
Operation Fortitude and D-Day are perhaps the quintessential example—implicitly rests
on the assumption that players' rationality and beliefs are at least mutual knowledge
(Aumann and Brandenburger (1995, Theorem A)). These assumptions are more than
usually strained in HM's model, whose equilibria involve a delicate balance of wholly or
partly mixed strategies that depend on the details of the signal distribution.
This paper shows that a sensible account of misrepresentation of intentions can be
given, in a simpler game, and with costless and noiseless messages, by allowing for the
possibility of bounded strategic rationality. The model and analysis fully reflect the low
message costs, the importance of payoff asymmetry across actions, and the difficulty of
justifying a delicate equilibrium analysis of a game without precedent just noted.
The model is based on the class of zero-sum two-person perturbed Matching
Pennies games in Figure 1. Two players, a Sender (analogous to the Allies) and a
6HM"s onlyreference to theasymmetryis tonote that when their signal isnot veryinformative, if the
attacker's payoffs make one location easier to attack, that location is more likely to be attacked.6
Receiver, choose simultaneously between two pure actions, U for Up (analogous to
attacking at Calais) or D for Down for the Sender and L for Left (analogous to defending
Normandy) and R for Right for the Receiver. I assume throughout that a > 1, reflecting
the lesser difficulty of an unanticipated invasion of Calais. Before playing this underlying
game, the Sender sends the Receiver a costless, non-binding, noiseless message, u or d,
about his intended action, with u (d) representing action U (D) in a commonly understood
language (Farrell (1993)). Players then choose their actions simultaneously. The structure
of the game is common knowledge. These games differ from HM's in having costless and
noiseless messages separate from the attacker's force allocation, simultaneous, 0-1















Figure 1. The underlying game
In a standard equilibrium analysis of this game, in any equilibrium (subgame-
perfect or not) the Sender's message must be uninformative, in that the probability that he
plays U conditional on his message is independent of the message; and the Receiver must
ignore it, in the sense that the probability that he plays L is independent of the Sender's
message.
8 The underlying game must therefore be played according to its unique mixed-
strategy equilibrium, in which the Sender plays U with probability 1/(1+a)a n dt h e
Receiver plays L with probability 1/(1+a), with respective expected payoffs a/(1+a)a n d
–a/(1+a).
9 Thus, communication is ineffective and misrepresentation cannot occur.
7Because each side's forces were actually somewhat dispersed, the discrete force allocations in the present
model should be thought of as representing principal attack or defense locations.
8The Sender can make his message uninformative by choosing a strategy in which he always sends the
same message, or a strategy in which he randomizes his message independently of his action.
9This equilibrium illustrates a strategic principle noted by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
(1953 [first edition 1944 (!)], pp. 175-176) in that, counterintuitively, the Sender's probability of playing U
is, like the Receiver's probability of playing L, a decreasing function of a. Thus, in Operation Fortitude, the7
The closest precedents for a non-equilibrium analysis of this kind of game are
Farrell (1988) and Rabin (1994), who study preplay communication about intentions via
cheap talk, mainly in games in which players have substantial common interests, using
augmented notions of rationalizability.
10 The model proposed here is similar in spirit, but
it relaxes the assumption of equilibrium in a different way, imposing more structure on
players' behavior by allowing for the possibility that they use simple, boundedly rational
decision rules. The analysis is otherwise completely standard.
Specifically, I assume that each player role is filled randomly from a separate
distribution of decision rules, or types, that assigns positive probability to certain
boundedly rational, or Mortal, types as well as to a Sophisticated type that is a natural
extension of the idealof a fully strategicallyrationalplayer to this setting. Players do not
observe each other's types, but the structure of the game, including the type distributions,
is common knowledge. Sophisticated players satisfy the usual mutual knowledge of
beliefs and rationality assumptions with respect to each other, and they can also use their
knowledge of the structure to predict the probability distributions of Mortal players'
strategies.
11 Mortal players can be thought of as rational expected-payoff maximizers, if
desired, but their beliefs about others' strategies generally differ from equilibrium beliefs.
The possibility of interacting with Mortal players fundamentally alters the game
from Sophisticated players' point of view. Because Mortal players' strategies are
determined independently of each other's and Sophisticated players' strategies, as
explained below, they can be treated as exogenous, allowing the analysis to focus on a
reduced game between possible Sophisticated players in each role.
12 In this game, a
Sophisticated Sender's incentives to misrepresent his intentions weigh the equilibrium
Germans would ignore all messages and be more likely to defend Calais than Normandy. Crawford and
Dennis Smallwood (1984) analyze the comparative statics of such payoff changes in general two-person
zero-sum games with mixed-strategy equilibria, identifying the general principle that underlies this result.
10See also Miguel Costa-Gomes (2002), who extends Rabin's analysis to interpret experimental data.
11The Mortal types are adapted to communication games from the types based on iterated best responses in
Dale Stahl and Paul Wilson (1995) and Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Bruno Broseta (2001). Andreas
Blume et al. (1998, 2001) find evidence of some such types in experiments with communication games.
The Sophisticated types are adapted from the Sophisticated type in Costa-Gomes et al. (2001).
12An equilibrium analysis of the reduced game generalizes standard equilibrium analysis of the original
game, in that common knowledge that all players are Sophisticated would make their beliefs common
knowledge and therefore the same, and so in equilibrium (Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)). Similar
techniques are used by Colin Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho, and Juin-Kuan Chong (2002) to analyze a reduced
game with sophisticated and adaptive learners, elucidating a phenomenon they call "strategic teaching."8
response of a Sophisticated Receiver against those of various types of Mortal Receivers,
of whom some invert the Sender's message and others believe it. Thus the model adopts a
view of human nature close to Lincoln's, which is more nuanced and arguably more
realistic than Puck's. The reduced game is no longer zero-sum, because a Sophisticated
player's expected payoffs are influenced by possible interaction with a Mortal opponent,
whose payoff may differ from a Sophisticated opponent's. Its messages are no longer
cheap talk, because a Sophisticated Sender's message directly influences his expected
payoff via Mortal Receivers' responses. Finally, the reduced game has incomplete
information, and a Sophisticated Receiver can sometimes draw inferences from a
Sender's message about his type.
13 These differences suggest that an analysis with some
Mortal players may differ in interesting ways from a standard equilibrium analysis.
As one might expect, most features of the model's equilibria depend on the
relative frequencies of Sophisticated and Mortal players in each role, but the possibility
of Mortal players affects Sophisticated players' behavior in perhaps unexpected ways.
When the probabilities of a Sophisticated Sender and Receiver are high relative to
the payoff advantage of an unanticipated attack at Calais over one at Normandy, the
reduced game has a generically essentially unique sequential equilibrium in mixed
strategies, similar to the standard analysis's babbling message followed by mixed-strategy
equilibrium in the underlying game. In this case Sophisticated players' equilibrium mixed
strategies offset each other's gains from fooling Mortal players, and in each role,
Sophisticated players have the same expected payoffs as their Mortal counterparts.
Further, all types' expected payoffs are the same as in the standard analysis.
By contrast, when the probabilities of a Sophisticated Sender and Receiver are
low relative to the payoff advantage of Calais, the reduced game has a generically unique
sequential equilibrium in pure strategies.
14 In these equilibria a Sophisticated Receiver
13Only Sophisticated players play an active strategic role, but Mortal players' types, which determine their
strategies, influence Sophisticated players' equilibrium strategies and welfare. The role of Mortal players in
the analysis resembles Philip Reny's (1992) notion of explicable equilibrium, which models "trembles" via
"complete theories"; here, however, the trembles are not eliminated by passing to the limit. The preceding
observations suggest that the analysis is robust to small-to-moderate violations of its basic assumptions.
14Generic uniqueness of sequential equilibrium is unusual in signaling games, which normally have both
essential nonuniqueness and, in the case of cheap-talk games, inessentialnonuniqueness dueto the
ambiguity of the meaning of costless messages in equilibrium (Crawford and Sobel (1982)). My analysis
avoids this ambiguity because I assume that Mortal Receivers understand the literal meanings of the9
can predict a Sophisticated Sender's action, and vice versa; thus their communication is
"disciplined" in the sense of Farrell and Robert Gibbons (1989). In the present model,
however, the discipline comes from the implicit presence of Sophisticated players' Mortal
alter egos, rather than from real other players. Further, the Sender's message plays a
different role, conveying information about the Sender's type rather than his intentions.
When the probability of a Sophisticated Sender is relatively low and the
probability of a Mortal Receiver who believes the Sender's message is not too high, the
model has a unique sequential equilibrium in which a Sophisticated Sender sends
message u but plays D—like feinting at Calais and attacking at Normandy—and both a
Sophisticated Receiver and a Mortal Receiver who believes the Sender's message play
R—like defending Calais. In such an equilibrium, a Sophisticated Receiver plays R
because in the parameter configurations that support it, being "fooled" at a unit cost of 1
by a Sophisticated Sender is preferable to being "fooled" at a unit cost of a by both kinds
of Mortal Sender. There are also configurations with unique sequential equilibria in
which a Sophisticated Sender sends message d but plays U, but it is argued below that the
conditions for the equilibria that resemble Operation Fortitude are more realistic.
The explanation of Operation Fortitude these equilibria suggest is less subtle, and
perhaps more credible, than HM's explanation: Sophisticated Allied planners (or Mortal
planners who make a point of lying to Germans) conceal their preparations for invading
Normandy and fake preparations for invading Calais, knowing that the cost of faking is
low; that the Germans may be the type of Mortal who can be fooled this way; and that
even Sophisticated Germans prefer to defend Calais because they think the Allies are
probably Mortal, and if so will attack at Calais. Mortal Germans who believe the Allies'
messages are fooled because they are too literal-minded (or perhaps too clever) to see
through the deception.
15 Sophisticated Germans see through the deception, but still prefer
to defend Calais, even at the risk of being "fooled" by possiblySophisticated Allies.
Sender's messages and other players know this. It avoids essential nonuniqueness because Mortal Senders
ensure that both messages have positive probability, and Senders' and Receivers' interests are opposed.
15As explained below, Mortal Germans are fooled if they believe they are an even number of steps ahead of
the Sender, in the hierarchy of iterated-best-response types. Other types of Mortal German are not fooled
because they believe they are an odd number of steps ahead; but Sophisticated Allied planners know that
(in this case) such types are less likely than Mortal Germans who will be fooled by feinting at Normandy.10
Importantly for applications, in this explanation Sophisticated players' sequential
equilibrium strategies (pure or mixed) depend only on the payoffs and population
parameters that reflect simple, portable facts about human behavior that could be learned
in many conflict situations, without regard to the quality of the analogy with the present
situation (fortunately, for applications as unprecedented as Operation Fortitude). Further,
in all the model's pure-strategy sequential equilibria, Sophisticated players' strategies are
their unique extensive-form rationalizable strategies, identifiable by at most three steps of
iterated conditional dominance (Makoto Shimoji and Joel Watson (1998)).
With regard to welfare, Sophisticated players in either role by definition do at
least as well in equilibrium as their Mortal counterparts. In the mixed-strategy sequential
equilibria that arise when the probabilities of a Sophisticated Sender and Receiver are
both relatively high, in each role Sophisticated and Mortal players have the same
expected payoffs: Perhaps surprisingly, the prevalence of Sophisticated players fully
protects Mortal players from exploitation. By contrast, in pure-strategy sequential
equilibria (and in some mixed-strategy sequential equilibria), Sophisticated players in
either role do strictly better than their Mortal counterparts. Their advantage comes from
their ability to avoid being fooled (except by choice, when it is the lesser of two evils)
and from Sophisticated Senders' ability to choose which type(s) of Receiver to fool.
These results suggest that an adaptive analysis of the dynamics of the type
distribution, in the style of Conlisk (2001), would show that Sophisticated and Mortal
players can coexist in long-run equilibrium whether or not Sophisticated players have
higher costs, justifying the assumptions about the type probabilities maintained here.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I completes the specification
of the model by describing the behavior of Mortal types and showing how to construct
the reduced game. Section II characterizes the model's sequential equilibria, showing how
theydepend on the payoffs and the type distribution. Section III compares Mortal and
Sophisticated Sender and Receiver types' equilibrium welfares and briefly discusses an
adaptive model of the evolution of the type distribution. Section IV discusses related
work, and Section V is the conclusion.
16I am grateful to Kang-Oh Yi for this observation.11
I. The Model
This section completes the specification of the model by describing Mortal types'
behavior, and shows how to construct the reduced game between Sophisticated players.
A Sender's pure strategies are (message, action|sent u, action|sent d) = (u,U,U),
(u,U,D), (u,D,U), (u,D,D), (d,U,U), (d,U,D), (d,D,U), or (d,D,D); and a Receiver's are
(action|received u, action|received d) = (L,L), (L,R), (R,L), or (R,R). Table 1 lists some
plausible Mortal Sender and Receiver types, with their Sophisticated counterparts.
17
Sender type Behavior (b.r. ≡ best response) message, action|sent u, action|sent d
Credible ≡ W0 tells the truth u,U,D
W1 (Wily)l i e s ( b . r . t o S0) d,D,U
W2 tells truth (b.r. to S1) u,U,D
W3 lies (b.r. to S2) d,D,U
Sophisticated b.r. to population depends on the type probabilities
Receiver type Behavior action|received u, action|received d
Credulous ≡ S0 believes (b.r. to W0) R,L
S1 (Skeptical) inverts (b.r. to W1)L , R
S2 believes (b.r. to W2)R , L
S3 inverts (b.r. to W3)L , R
Sophisticated b.r. to population depends on the type probabilities
Table 1. Mortal and Sophisticated Sender and Receiver types
Like most boundedly rational strategic decision rules, these Mortal types use step-
by-step procedures that generically determine unique, pure strategies, and avoid
simultaneous determination of the kind used to define equilibrium. In the words of
Reinhard Selten (1998, p. 433), "Basic concepts in game theory are often circular in the
sense that they are based on definitions by implicit properties….Boundedly, [sic] rational
strategic reasoning seems to avoid circular concepts. It directly results in a procedure by
which a problem solution is found. Each step of the procedure is simple, even if many
case distinctions by simple criteria may have to be made." Mortal players' strategies are
therefore determined independently of each other's and Sophisticated players' strategies.
This independence allows a simple characterization of the implications of
bounded rationality. Restricting attention to the Mortal types in Table 1 for definiteness,12
note that a Wily Sender, Wj,w i t hj odd always lies; I lump these Mortal Sender types
together under the heading Liars from now on. A Wily Sender with j even (including
Credible as an honorary Wily type, W0) always tells the truth; I lump these types together
under the heading Truthtellers. Similarly, a Skeptical Receiver, Sk,w i t hk odd always
inverts the Sender's message, and a Skeptical Receiver with k even (including Credulous
as an honorary Skeptical type, S0) always believes it; I lump these Mortal Receiver types
together under the headings Inverters and Believers.
18 Thus, the behavior of a Sender
population can be summarized by sl≡ Pr{Sender is a Liar}, st≡ Pr{Sender is a
Truthteller}, and ss ≡ Pr{Sender is Sophisticated}, where sl+ st+ ss=1 ;a n dt h eb e h a v i o r
of a Receiver population can be summarized by ri≡ Pr{Receiver is an Inverter}, rb≡
Pr{Receiver is a Believer}, and rs≡ Pr{Receiver is Sophisticated}, where ri+ rb+ rs=1 .
To avoid trivialities, I assume that these type probabilities are all strictly positive
in both populations. I also ignore nongeneric parameter configurations, and all "if and
only if" (henceforth "iff") statements should be interpreted in the generic sense.
Table 1 shows that, although Inverters and Believers always choose different
actions for a given message, its Mortal Sender types always play U on the equilibrium
path. This conclusion follows naturally from the fact that U yields the Sender higher
expected payoffs, other things equal; but it does not hold for all conceivable boundedly
rational Sender types. Nonetheless, I shall maintain it as a plausible simplifying
assumption; moderate violations would not significantly alter the results.
Because all Mortal Senders play U on the equilibrium path, Liars always send
message d and Truthtellers send message u. Thus, both messages always have positive
probability, and a Sophisticated Sender is always pooled with one Mortal Sender type.
After receiving a message for which a Sophisticated Sender's strategy specifies
playing U with probability 1, like Mortal Senders, a Sophisticated Receiver's best
response is R. But otherwise his best response may depend on his posterior probability or
belief, z, that the Sender is Sophisticated.I fx is the message and y is a Sophisticated
17I assume for convenience that Credible Senders play u,U,D rather than d,U,D, even though both strategies
are truthful and both yield the Sender the same payoff, 0, if his message is always believed. Credible
Senders could be given a strict preference for u,U,D by perturbing payoffs slightly.
18That such types can be lumped together in this way illustrates a kind of paradox of bounded strategic
rationality, in that with a finitenumber of possibilities for guessing and outguessing, it is as bad to be too13
Sender's probability of sending message u, a Sophisticated Receiver's belief is determined
by Bayes' Rule: z ≡ f(x,y), where f(u,y) ≡ yss/(st+yss)a n df(d,y) ≡ (1–y)ss/[(1–y)ss+sl].
Receiver
L,L L,R R,L R,R
u,U,U a(ri+rs),– a a (ri+rs),– a a r i, 0 A ari, 0 B
u,U,D a(ri+rs),– a a (ri+rs),– a a r i, 0 A' ari, 0 B'
u,D,U rb, –ast/(ss+st) rb, –ast/(ss+st)( rb+rs),– s s/(ss+ st)( rb+rs),– s s/(ss+st) Γ
u,D,D rb, –ast/(ss+st) rb, –ast/(ss+st)( rb+rs),– s s/(ss+ st)( rb+rs),– s s/(ss+st) Γ '
d,U,U a(rb+ rs),– a a r b, 0 ∆ a(rb+rs),– a a r b, 0 Ε
d,U,D ri, –asl/(ss+sl)( ri+ rs),– s s/(ss+sl) ri, –asl/(ss+sl)( ri+rs),– s s/(ss+sl) Ζ
d,D,U a(rb+ rs),– a a r b, 0 ∆ ' a(rb+rs),– a a r b, 0 Ε'
Sender
d,D,D ri, –asl/(ss+sl)( ri+ rs),– s s/(ss+sl) ri, –asl/(ss+sl)( ri+rs),– s s/(ss+sl) Ζ'




















Figure 3a. "u" game following message u Figure 3b. "d" game following message d
Figure 2 gives the payoff matrix of the reduced game between a Sophisticated
Sender and Receiver, using these observations to derive Sophisticated players' expected
payoffs. If, for example, a Sophisticated Sender's strategy is u,U,D and a Sophisticated
Receiver's strategy is R,L, the former plays U and the latter plays R when he receives
message u. Thus, all Sender types play U, Inverters play L, Believers and Sophisticated
Receivers play R, a Sophisticated Sender's expected payoff is ari,a n daSophisticated
Receiver's is 0. If, instead, a Sophisticated Sender's strategy is u,D,U and a Sophisticated
much wilier, or more skeptical, than one's opponent as to be too much less wily, or skeptical. By contrast,14
Receiver's strategy is L,R, the former plays D and the latter plays L when he receives
message u. All other Sender types play U, Inverters play L, and Believers play R. A
Sophisticated Sender's expected payoff is rb;a n daSophisticated Receiver's, whose
posterior belief that the Sender is Mortal is 1–s s/(st+ ss) ≡ st/(st + ss), is –ast/(st+ss).
Figure 3 gives the payoff matrices of the reduced "u" and "d" games following
messages u and d, as determined by a Sophisticated Receiver's belief, z ≡ f(x,y).
Because messages are costless, the only difference between type populations in
which the frequencies of Mortal Senders and Receivers are interchanged is which
message fools which type. Figure 2 reflects this symmetry, in that simultaneous
permutations of the probabilities of Liars and Truthtellers,a n do fBelievers and Inverters,
yield an equivalent game. Figure 3's u and d games are identical except for interchanged
roles of ri and rb, because they differ only in whether Inverters or Believers are fooled.
II. Analysis
In this section I characterize the sequential equilibria of the reduced game, as
functions of the payoff a and the type probabilities. Sequential equilibrium combines the
standard notion of sequential rationality with consistency restrictions on players' beliefs.
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(E) d,U,U; R,R iff rb> ri, arb + ri>1 ,a n dri>1 / ( 1 + a) (true iff rb> ri>1 / ( 1 + a))
(E') d,D,U; R,R iff rb> ri, arb + ri>1 ,a n dri<1 / ( 1 + a)
(Γ) u,D,U; R,R iff rb> ri, arb + ri<1 ,rb>1 / ( 1 + a), and ss < ast
(Γm) m,D,U; R,R iff rb> ri, arb + ri<1 ,rb>1 / ( 1 + a), and ss > ast
(Γ') u,D,D; R,R iff rb> ri, arb + ri<1 ,rb<1 / ( 1 + a), and ss < ast (true iff ri< rb<1 / ( 1 + a))
(Γ'm)m , M u,Md;M u,Md iff rb> ri, arb + ri<1 ,rb<1 / ( 1 + a), and ss> ast
(B) u,U,U; R,R iff ri> rb, ari + rb>1 ,a n drb>1 / ( 1 + a) (true iff ri> rb>1 / ( 1 + a))
(B') u,U,D; R,R iff ri> rb, ari + rb>1 ,a n drb<1 / ( 1 + a)
(Ζ) d,U,D; R,R iff ri> rb, ari + rb<1 ,ri>1 / ( 1 + a), and ss < asl
(Ζm) m,U,D; R,R iff ri> rb, ari + rb<1 ,ri>1 / ( 1 + a), and ss > asl
(Z') d,D,D; R,R iff ri> rb, ari + rb<1 ,ri<1 / ( 1 + a), and ss < asl (true iff rb< ri<1 / ( 1 + a))
(Z'm)m , M u,Md;M u,Md iff ri> rb, ari + rb<1 ,ri<1 / ( 1 + a), and ss > asl
Table 2. Sequential equilibria of the reduced game
between a Sophisticated Sender and Receiver
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in Conlisk's (2001) model Tricksters always find a way to outwit Suckers, just as Puck does with mortals.
19Under my assumptions both messages always have positive probability, so zero-probability updating is
not an issue, and anynotion that captures the idea of sequential rationality would yield the same results.15
The Greek capital letters in Figure 2 identify the strategy combinations for
Sophisticated players that are pure-strategy equilibria of the reduced game (sequential or
not) for some parameter configurations. Table 2 lists the sequential equilibria for those
configurations, and Figure 4 [end of the paper] graphs the configurations in (ri,rb)-space.
Proposition 1, proved in the Appendix, is the basic characterization result:
PROPOSITION 1: Unless either rb> ri, arb + ri<1 ,a n dss > ast,o rri> rb, ari + rb<1 ,
and ss > asl, the reduced game has a generically unique sequential equilibrium in pure
strategies, in which a Sophisticated Sender's and Receiver's strategies are as given in
Table 2 and Figure 4. In these sequential equilibria, a Sophisticated Receiver's strategy is
R,R; and a Sophisticated Sender plays U (D) on the equilibrium path iff a max{rb,ri}+
min{rb,ri}>( < )1a n ds e n d sm e s s a g ed( u )i f frb>( < )ri. Sophisticated players' sequential
equilibrium strategies are their unique extensive-form rationalizable strategies,
identifiable by at most three steps of iterated conditional dominance.
If, instead, either (i) rb> ri, arb + ri<1 ,a n dss > ast; or (ii) ri> rb, ari + rb<1 ,a n d
ss > asl, the reduced game has a generically unique or essentially unique mixed-strategy
sequential equilibrium, in which a Sophisticated Sender's and Receiver's strategies are as
g i v e ni nT a b l e2a n dF i g u r e4 .I nc a s e( i ) ,i frb<1 / ( 1 + a), there are multiple mixed-
strategy sequential equilibria, in each of which a Sophisticated Sender sends message u
with probability y,w h e r east/ss < y <( 1 – a)st/ss. Each of these y values leads to u and d
games with a different, unique mixed-strategy equilibrium. In these equilibria a
Sophisticated Sender plays U with probability 1–a/(1+a)[yss/(st+yss)] = [1– ast/yss]/(1+a)
in the u game and 1–a/(1+a)[(1–y)ss/{sl +( 1 –y)ss}] = [1– asl/(1–y)ss]/(1+a) in the d game;
a Sophisticated Receiver plays L with probability [1– (1+a)rb]/(1+a)rsin the u game and
[1– (1+a)rb]/(1+a)rsin the d game; a Sophisticated Sender's equilibrium expected payoff
is a/(1+a); and a Sophisticated Receiver's equilibrium expected payoff is –a/(1+a).
21
20m refers to a probability mixture over messages u and d, and Mu (Md) refers to the player's part of the
relevant mixed-strategy equilibrium in the u (d) game, both described precisely in Proposition 1.
21Thus, there are multiple sequential equilibria, but sequential equilibrium is generically essentially unique
in that in each role, they all have the same expected payoffs for Sophisticated and Mortal players.16
In case (i), if rb>1 / ( 1 + a), there is a unique mixed-strategy sequential equilibrium,
in which a Sophisticated Sender sends message u with probability y = st/assand plays D
in the u game and U in the d game; a Sophisticated Receiver plays R in the u game and
the d game; a Sophisticated Sender's expected payoff is (st/ass)(rb+ rs)+( 1 –st/ass)arb,
and a Sophisticated Receiver's expected payoff is –st/[a(1+a)ss].
In case (ii), where ri> rb, ari + rb<1 ,a n dss > asl, the conclusions are the same as
in case (i), but with the roles of riand rb,a n do fsland st, reversed.
It may seem surprising that a Sophisticated Receiver's strategy is R,R in all pure-
strategy sequential equilibria. This conclusion's asymmetry across actions stems from the
fact that because a >1 ,a l lMortal Senders play U, and it holds trivially if there are
enough Mortal Senders to make R a dominant strategy in the underlying game; but the
conclusion holds even if there are not enough Mortal Senders, as long as the game has a
pure-strategy sequential equilibrium. The reason is that if a Sophisticated Sender deviates
from his pure-strategy equilibrium message, the deviation "proves" to a Sophisticated
Receiver that the Sender is Mortal, making his best response R off the equilibrium path.
But in the only pure-strategy equilibria (sequential or not) in which a Sophisticated
Receiver's strategy is not R,R, a Sophisticated Sender plays U on the equilibrium path, so
a Sophisticated Receiver must also play R on the equilibrium path.
The rest of Proposition 1's conclusions concerning pure-strategy equilibria are
straightforward, given that a Sophisticated Receiver always plays R,R. Because a
Sophisticated Sender cannot truly fool a Sophisticated Receiver in equilibrium,
whichever action he chooses in the underlying game, it is always best to send the
message that fools whichever type of Mortal Receiver, Believer or Inverter,i sm o r e
likely. The only remaining choice is whether to play U or D, when, with the optimal
message, the former action fools max{rb,ri} Mortal Receivers at a gain of a per unit and
the latter fools them at a gain of 1 per unit, but also "fools" rs Sophisticated Receivers.
Simple algebra reduces this question to whether a max{rb,ri} + min{rb,ri}>1o r<1 .
It is clear from Figure 4 that the model's pure-strategy sequential equilibria avoid
the perverse comparative statics of equilibrium mixed strategies with respect to a in the
standard analysis, noted in fn. 9. Within the region that supports a given pure-strategy17
equilibrium, a does not affect Mortal or Sophisticated players' strategies at all. However,
as intuition suggests, increasing a always enlarges the set of type frequencies that support
equilibria in which a Sophisticated Sender's equilibrium action is U (B, B', E, or E').
Proposition 1's conclusions concerning mixed-strategy equilibria in case (i) if rb<
1/(1+a)( Γ'm), or in case (ii) if ri<1 / ( 1 + a)( Z ' m), are straightforward extensions of the
standard analysis to parameter configurations in which the probabilities of a
Sophisticated Sender and Receiver are both high.
22 But in case (i) if rb>1 / ( 1 + a)( Γm), or
case (ii) if ri>1 / ( 1 + a)( Z m), the model has unique mixed-strategy sequential equilibria
with a different character, in which randomization is confined to a Sophisticated Sender's
message, and serves to "punish" a Sophisticated Receiver for deviating from R,R in a
way that relaxes the ss ≤ ast or ss ≤ aslconstraint whose violation prevents a Sophisticated
Sender from realizing the higher expected payoff of equilibrium Γ or Z. These equilibria
are otherwise similar to the pure-strategy equilibria Γ or Z for adjoining parameter
configurations, and converge to them as the relevant population parameters converge.
In both kinds of mixed-strategy equilibrium, players' strategies are determined by
simple, portable behavioral parameters as for pure-strategy equilibria; but both share
some of the delicacy of HM's equilibria, and of mixed-strategy equilibria more generally.
To assess the model's ability to explain Operation Fortitude, consider the
parameter values that lead to the sequential equilibria Γ or Γ'. In general, the conditions
for Γ or Γ' to be a sequential equilibrium are rb> ri, arb + ri<1 ,a n dss < ast. rb> ri
reflects a preponderance of Believers over Inverters that seems quite plausible, so I shall
assume it.
23 Given this, suppose that rb= criand sl = cstfor some constant c. Then, Γ or Γ'
is sequential iff rb< c/((ac +1) and ss < a/(1+a+c). When a =1 . 4 ,a si nF i g u r e4 ,a n dc =
3, which seem plausible values, these conditions reduce to rb<0 . 5 8a n dss < 0.26,
plausible ranges for these parameters.
24 By contrast, the conditions for the "reverse
Fortitude" sequential equilibria E or E' are rb> riand arb + ri> 1. Again assuming that rb
> riand rb= cri, E or E' is sequential iff rb> c/((ac +1). When a =1 . 4a n dc =3 ,t h e
condition reduces to rb> 0.58. Thus, if the Germans are thought sufficiently likely to be
22This part of Proposition 1 shows that the standard analysis is robust to some bounded rationality of the
kind considered here, but this may be an artifact of the discrete action spaces of the underlying game.
23If ri> rb the sequential equilibria Z or Z' would duplicate the outcomes of Γ or Γ', with inverted messages.
24Higher values of a make the first condition more stringent and the second less stringent.18
gullible, it is better to feint at Normandy and attack at Calais. However, in this
application rb> 0.58 seems less realistic than the conjunction of rb<0 . 5 8a n dss < 0.26.
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III. Welfare Analysis
This section conducts a welfare analysis of the model's sequential equilibria,
comparing the expected payoffs of Mortal and Sophisticated types. The comparisons use
actual rather than anticipated expected payoffs for Mortal types, whose beliefs may be
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Inverter L, R, –ast L, R, –ast L, R, –ast L, R, –a/(1+a)
Sophisticated R, R, 0 R, R, –ss –ss(st/ass)=– st/a Mu,Md,– a/(1+a)
Table 3. Expected payoffs of Mortal and Sophisticated Sender and Receiver types (rb > ri)
Table 3 lists all types' messages, actions, and expected payoffs on the possible
sequential equilibrium paths, extending Figure 2's payoff calculations and Proposition 1's
25The plausibility of the Γ or Γ' equilibria may be further enhanced by thehuman tendency to overrate one's
own strategic sophistication relative to others'. Further, Γmis behaviorally similar to Γ, and so one might
relax Γ's restriction on ss, at the cost of a random prediction of a Sophisticated Sender's message.19
characterization of equilibrium behavior from Sophisticated to Mortal players.
26 The
table shows that Sophisticated players in either role have expected payoffs at least as high
as their Mortal counterparts'. This much is true by definition, because Sophisticated
players can always mimic Mortal players, but in pure-strategy equilibria, Sophisticated
players have strictly higher payoffs. Sophisticated Senders' advantage over Mortal
Senders in these equilibria stems from their ability to avoid being fooled and to choose
which type(s) to fool. Sophisticated Receivers' advantage comes from their ability to
avoid being fooled, or to choose the least costly way to be "fooled."
Sophisticated players enjoy a smaller advantage in the mixed-strategy sequential
equilibria Γm or Zm, but for similar reasons. By contrast, in the mixed-strategy sequential
equilibria Γm'o rZ m', Sophisticated players' equilibrium mixed strategies completely
offset each other's gains from fooling Mortal Receivers, and in each role, Sophisticated
and Mortal players have the same expected payoffs. Thus, in this case, the prevalence of
Sophisticated players protects Mortal players from exploitation.
IV. Related Work
This section briefly discusses related work.
Sobel (1985) was the first to propose an equilibrium explanation of lying,
studying an "enemy" Sender's incentives in repeated interaction to build and eventually
exploit a reputation for being a "friend" of the Receiver's. His analysis focused on
communication of private information in settings with asymmetric information about the
Sender's preferences, as opposed to the asymmetric information about the Sender's and
the Receiver's strategic thinking analyzed here. Benabou and Laroque (1992) extended
Sobel's analysis to allow the Sender to have noisy private information, and used it to
analyze the use of inside information to manipulate financial markets.
27
Farrell and Gibbons' (1989) analysis of costless communication to multiple
audiences has already been mentioned. Loury (1994) provides a different perspective on
the issues that arise with multiple audiences.
26Table 3 sometimes combines the equilibrium-path outcomes of more than one equilibrium, to save space.
The equilibrium actions may therefore differ from Sophisticated players' sequential equilibrium strategies.
27See also John Morgan and Philip Stocken's (2001) analysis of financial analysts' incentives to reveal
private information to investors, and some of the references cited there.20
Finally, Conlisk (2001) studied the adaptive dynamics of selection in favor of
types with higher payoffs among a different set of types, Trickster, Avoider,a n dSucker,
taking the "fooling technology" as given (fn. 18). He showed that if those types have
successively lower costs they can coexist in long-run equilibrium, proving (in a special
case) P. T. Barnum's dictum, "There's a sucker born every minute, and two to take him."
Section III's calculation of the types' equilibrium expected payoffs in the present
model could be used to conduct a similar adaptive analysis. I conjecture that unless
Sophisticated players have higher costs, their payoff advantage in pure-strategy (and
some mixed-strategy) equilibria will lead their relative frequencies to grow until the
population frequencies enter the region of mixed-strategy equilibria in which all types'
expected payoffs are equal (region Γ'-Z' in Figure 4). The population can then be
expected to drift among a continuum of neutral steady states in that region. If
Sophisticated players have slightly higher costs, the population frequencies should
approach and remain near the boundary of region Γ'-Z', without entering it.
28 This would
also allow Sophisticated and Mortal players to coexist in long-run equilibrium, justifying
the assumptions about the type frequencies maintained here.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, I have proposed a way to model active misrepresentation of
intentions to competitors or enemies. The model focuses on the strategic interaction
between rational and boundedly rational types of players in a game of conflicting
interests, with one-sided preplay communication via costless messages.
Allowing for the possibility of bounded rationality yields a sensible account of
lying via costless, noiseless messages, and simplifies many aspects of the analysis of
games with communication. For many parameter configurations, in contrast to a standard
analysis of communication with conflicting interests, the model has generically unique
pure-strategy sequential equilibria, in which rational players exploit boundedly rational
28This conclusion is not immediate because the present model has two player populations and a more
complex pattern of payoff advantages than Conlisk's model. There, taking cost differences into account, in
pairwise interactions Tricksters do better than Suckers, Suckers do better than Avoiders,a n dAvoiders do
better than Tricksters. Here, with equal costs for Mortal players and higher costs for Sophisticated players
in each player role, Liars do better than Truthtellers iff there are more Believers than Inverters,a n d21
players, but are not themselves fooled. In these equilibria, players' strategies are
determined by simple, portable behavioral parameters, and can be identified by iterated
elimination of conditionally dominated strategies. One of these equilibria plausibly
explains the Allies' decision to feint at Calais and attack at Normandy on D-Day.
For other parameter configurations, the model has generically unique or
essentially unique mixed-strategy sequential equilibria, in which rational players'
equilibrium strategies offset each other's gains from fooling boundedly rational players,
completely protecting them from exploitation. In these equilibria, players' strategies are
still determined by simple, portable behavioral parameters, but they share some of the
delicacy of mixed-strategy equilibria in other games.
I hope that the methods for modeling bounded strategic rationality used here can
elucidate strategic communication when players' interests are not in conflict, and can also
be used to create behaviorally realistic models of strategic behavior in other applications.
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Appendix. Proof of Proposition 1
I begin by characterizing the equilibria of the u and d games (Figure 3), as
determined by a Sophisticated Receiver's belief, z, that the Sender is Sophisticated.
LEMMA 1. The u game has a generically unique equilibrium as follows:
(i) U,R is a pure-strategy equilibrium iff ri >1 / ( 1 + a);
(ii) D,L is a pure-strategy equilibrium iff rb> a/(1+a)a n dz > a/(1+a);
(iii) D,R is a pure-strategy equilibrium iff ri<1 / ( 1 + a)a n dz < a/(1+a); and
(iv) there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium, with Pr{Sophisticated S e n d e rp l a y sU }=1–
a/(1+a)z,P r { Sophisticated Receiver plays L} = [1– (1+a)ri]/(1+a)rs, Sophisticated24
Sender's expected payoff a/(1+a), and Sophisticated Receiver's expected payoff –a/(1+a),
iff ri<1 / ( 1 + a), rb < a/(1+a)a n dz > a/(1+a).
The d game has a generically unique equilibrium as follows:
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(i) U,R is a pure-strategy equilibrium iff rb>1 / ( 1 + a);
(ii) D,L is a pure-strategy equilibrium iff ri> a/(1+a)a n dz > a/(1+a);
(iii) D,R is a pure-strategy equilibrium iff rb<1 / ( 1 + a)a n dz < a/(1+a); and
(iv) there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium, with Pr{Sophisticated S e n d e rp l a y sU }=1–
a/(1+a)z,P r { Sophisticated Receiver plays L} = [1– (1+a)rb]/(1+a)rs, Sophisticated
Sender's expected payoff a/(1+a), and Sophisticated Receiver's expected payoff –a/(1+a),
iff rb<1 / ( 1 + a), ri < a/(1+a)a n dz > a/(1+a).
PROOF: Straightforward calculations, noting that (U,L) is never an equilibrium, and,
because ri>1 / ( 1 + a)a n drb> a/(1+a) or vice versa are inconsistent, the conditions for (i)-
(iv) are mutually exclusive and (with nongeneric exceptions) collectively exhaustive. □
Lemmas 2-3, which correspond to the pure- and mixed-strategy cases considered
in Proposition 1, characterize the sequential equilibria of the reduced game.
LEMMA 2: Unless either rb> ri, arb + ri<1 ,a n dss > ast,o rri> rb, ari + rb<1 ,a n dss >
asl, the reduced game has a generically unique sequential equilibrium in pure strategies,
in which a Sophisticated Sender's and Receiver's strategies are as given in Table 2 and
Figure 4. In these sequential equilibria, a Sophisticated Receiver's strategy is R,R; and a
Sophisticated Sender plays U (D) on the equilibrium path iff a max{rb,ri} + min{rb,ri}>
(<) 1 and sends message d (u) iff rb>( < )ri. Sophisticated players' sequential equilibrium
strategies are their unique extensive-form rationalizable strategies, identifiable by at most
three steps of iterated conditional dominance.
PROOF: Because all types have positive prior probability and Liars and Truthtellers
send different messages, all messages have positive probability in equilibrium. Further, in
any pure-strategy sequential equilibrium, a Sophisticated Sender's message is pooled with
29The characterization here is identical to that for the "u" subgame, with the roles of rband riinterchanged.25
either Liars'o rTruthtellers' message, so a deviation to the other message makes z =0 .I n
the u or d game that follows such a deviation, R is a conditionally dominant strategy for a
Sophisticated Receiver; and a Sophisticated Sender's unique best response is U (D) iff ri>
(<) 1/(1+a) in the u game and U (D) iff rb> (<) 1/(1+a)i nt h edg a m eb yL e m m a1 .
All that remains is to identify the strategy combinations in Figure 2 that are
equilibria for some parameter configurations, use these conditions to check which
configurations make them sequential, and check the other conclusions of the lemma.
Identifying the configurations by the Greek capital letters in Figure 2, ∆ and ∆'a r e
equilibria iff rb>½ .F o r∆ to be sequential, U,L must be an equilibrium in the u game
when z = 0, which is never true. For ∆' to be sequential, D,L must be an equilibrium in
the u game when z = 0, which is never true. Thus neither ∆ nor ∆' is ever sequential.
Similarly, A and A' are equilibria iff rb> ½, but neither A nor A' is ever sequential.
E and E' are equilibria iff rb> riand arb> rb + rs, which reduces to arb + ri>1 .F o r
E to be sequential, U,R must be an equilibrium in the u game when z = 0, which is true iff
ri>1 / ( 1 + a). Thus E is sequential iff rb> ri, arb + ri>1 ,a n dri>1 / ( 1 + a), where the second
condition is implied by the first and third. For E' to be sequential, D,R must be an
equilibrium in the u game when z = 0, which is true iff ri<1 / ( 1 + a). Thus E' is sequential
iff rb> ri, arb + ri>1 ,a n dri<1 / ( 1 + a). Similarly, B and B' are equilibria iff ri> rband ari
+ rb> 1; B is sequential iff ri> rb, ari + rb>1 ,a n drb>1 / ( 1 + a), where the second
condition is implied by the first and third; and B' is sequential iff ri> rb, ari + rb>1 ,a n d
rb<1 / ( 1 + a).
Γ and Γ' are equilibria iff ss < ast, rb> ri,a n drb + rs> arb, which reduces to arb +
ri<1 .F o rΓ to be sequential, U,R must be an equilibrium in the d game when z =0 ,
which is true iff rb>1 / ( 1 + a). Thus Γ is sequential iff ss < ast, rb> ri, arb + ri<1 ,a n drb>
1/(1+a). For Γ' to be sequential, D,R must be an equilibrium in the d game when z =0 ,
which is true iff rb<1 / ( 1 + a). Thus Γ' is sequential iff ss < ast, rb> ri, arb + ri<1 ,a n drb<
1/(1+a), where the second condition is implied by the first and third. Similarly, Z and Z'
are equilibria iff ss < asl, ri> rb,a n dari + rb< 1; Z is sequential iff ss < asl, ri> rb, ari + rb
< 1, where the second condition is implied by the first and third; and ri>1 / ( 1 + a). and Z'
is sequential iff ss < asl, ri> rb, ari + rb<1 ,a n dri<1 / ( 1 + a).26
In each case, the generic uniqueness of Sophisticated players' best responses can
be verified by iterated conditional dominance, starting with the pure-strategy equilibria in
the 2x2 u and d games. The remaining conclusions are easily verified by inspection. □
LEMMA 3: If either (i) rb> ri, arb + ri<1 ,a n dss > ast;o r( i i )ri> rb, ari + rb<1 ,
and ss > asl, the reduced game has a generically unique or essentially unique mixed-
strategy sequential equilibrium, in which a Sophisticated Sender's and Receiver's
s t r a t e g i e sa r ea sg i v e ni nT a b l e2a n dF i g u r e4 .I nc a s e( i ) ,i frb<1 / ( 1 + a), there are
multiple mixed-strategy sequential equilibria, in each of which a Sophisticated Sender
sends message u with probability y,w h e r east/ss < y <( 1 – a)st/ss. Each of these y values
leads to u and d games with a different, unique mixed-strategy equilibrium. In these
equilibria a Sophisticated Sender plays U with probability 1–a/(1+a)[yss/(st+yss)] = [1–
ast/yss]/(1+a) in the u game and 1–a/(1+a)[(1–y)ss/{sl +( 1 –y)ss}] = [1– asl/(1–y)ss]/(1+a)
in the d game; a Sophisticated Receiver plays L with probability [1– (1+a)rb]/(1+a)rsin
the u game and [1– (1+a)rb]/(1+a)rsin the d game; a Sophisticated Sender's equilibrium
expected payoff is a/(1+a); and a Sophisticated Receiver's equilibrium expected payoff is
–a/(1+a).
In case (i), if rb>1 / ( 1 + a), there is a unique mixed-strategy sequential equilibrium,
in which a Sophisticated Sender sends message u with probability y = st/assand plays D
in the u game and U in the d game; a Sophisticated Receiver plays R in the u game and
the d game; a Sophisticated Sender's expected payoff is (st/ass)(rb+ rs)+( 1 –st/ass)arb,
and a Sophisticated Receiver's expected payoff is –st/[a(1+a)ss].
In case (ii), where ri> rb, ari + rb<1 ,a n dss > asl, the conclusions are the same as
in case (i), but with the roles of riand rb,a n do fsland st, reversed.
PROOF: In case (i), if rb<1 / ( 1 + a), and if z < a/(1+a) in either the u or the d game, D,R
would be its unique equilibrium. But then, in this case, a Sophisticated Sender would
prefer to send the message that led to that game with probability 1, and with z =0 ,p l a y e r s
would also have pure best responses in the other game by Lemma 1. But the proof of
Lemma 2 shows that there are no pure-strategy sequential equilibria in this case when ss
> ast. If, instead, z > a/(1+a) in each game, in this case the u and d games have unique
mixed-strategy equilibria as characterized in Lemma 1. yss/(st+yss)>a/(1+a)a n d( 1 –27
y)ss/[sl +( 1 –y)ss]>a/(1+a) provided that ast/ss < y <1 – asl/ss, which is always feasible
when ss > ast. Because a Sophisticated Sender's expected payoff is a/(1+a) in either the u
or the d game, he is willing to randomize with any such y. The rest of the proof in this
case is a straightforward translation of the conclusions of Lemma 1.
In case (i), if rb>1 / ( 1 + a), the d game always has a unique pure-strategy
equilibrium U,R, with expected payoff arb for a Sophisticated Sender. If y =0 ,t h eu
game would be off the equilibrium path, so message u would make z =0 ,a n dt h eug a m e
would have a unique pure-strategy equilibrium D,R, with payoff rb + rs > arb for a
Sophisticated Sender. Thus there cannot be an equilibrium in this case with y =0 .
Similarly, if y =1 ,i f frb < a/(1+a) the u game has a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium,
with z = ss/(st+ss)>a/(1+a) and expected payoff a/(1+a)<arb for a Sophisticated Sender.
If y =1a n drb > a/(1+a), the u game has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, D,L, and
expected payoff rb < arb for a Sophisticated Sender. Thus there cannot be an equilibrium
with y = 1. Because rb+rs > arb > a/(1+a) in this case, a Sophisticated Sender's optimal
choice of y maximizes y(rb+rs)+( 1 –y)arb subject to the constraint that D,R is an
equilibrium in the u game, which is true in this case iff z = yss/(st+yss) ≤ a/(1+a), or
equivalently y ≤ st/ass.T h u s ,aSophisticated Sender's optimal message strategy is y =
st/ass.
30 The rest of the proof follows directly from Lemma 1, noting that a Sophisticated
Receiver's expected payoff is –(st/ass)[ ( st/ass)ss]/[st+(st/ass)ss]=– st/[a(1+a)ss]. □
Lemma 3 completes the proof of Proposition 1.
30A Sophisticated Sender's best response is not y = 1 in this case, because in the reduced game Mortal
players' responses are treated as part of the payoff function, which effectively constrain his choice of y.28
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